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Abstract—Peer-to-peer trading is a next-generation energy man-
agement technique that economically benefits proactive consumers
(prosumers) transacting their energy as goods and services. At the
same time, peer-to-peer energy trading is also expected to help the
grid by reducing peak demand, lowering reserve requirements, and
curtailing network loss. However, large-scale deployment of peer-
to-peer trading in electricity networks poses a number of challenges
in modeling transactions in both the virtual and physical layers of
the network. As such, this article provides a comprehensive review
of the state-of-the-art in research on peer-to-peer energy trading
techniques. By doing so, we provide an overview of the key features
of peer-to-peer trading and its benefits of relevance to the grid and
prosumers. Then, we systematically classify the existing research
in terms of the challenges that the studies address in the virtual
and the physical layers. We then further identify and discuss those
technical approaches that have been extensively used to address
the challenges in peer-to-peer transactions. Finally, the paper is
concluded with potential future research directions.
Index Terms—Peer-to-peer trading, virtual layer, physical layer,
energy management, game theory, auction theory, blockchain,
storage, energy market, voltage violation, network loss, energy cost,
challenges, future research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, there has been an extensive growth
in small-scale distributed energy resources, which encompass
behind-the-meter generation, energy storage, inverters, electric
vehicles, and control loads. At the household level, in particular,
the increase in the use of distributed energy resources has been
unprecedented. For instance, the global market of rooftop solar
photovoltaic (PV) panels is expected to grow by 11% over the
next six years, with an additional increase in residential storage
systems from 95 MW in 2016 to 3700 MW by 2025 [1]. These
small-scale resources can be utilized not only to manage the
energy demand more efficiently, but also to enable a significant
mix of clean energy into the grid. However, to do so, it is
important for the owners of these assets to act as proactive
consumers — referred to here as prosumers — and actively
participate in the energy market.
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Given this context, feed-in-tariff (FiT) has been used exten-
sively to enable prosumers to participate in energy trading [2].
In FiT, prosumers with rooftop solar panels can sell their excess
solar energy to the grid and can buy energy again from the grid
in case of any energy deficiency [3]. Unfortunately, the benefit
to prosumers for participating in recent FiT schemes has been
very marginal [4]. As a consequence, FiT schemes have been
discontinued in some parts of the world such as the state of
Queensland in Australia [5].
As such, peer-to-peer (P2P) trading has emerged as a next
generation energy management technique for smart grid that can
enable prosumers to actively participate in the energy market
either by selling their excess energy [6] or by reducing the
demand of energy via Negawatts, i.e., demand reduction or
negative Watts [7]. With the prosumers in control of setting the
terms of transactions and the delivering of goods and services [8],
it is expected that the gain that the prosumers can reap from
participating in P2P trading would be substantial [9]. At the
same time, the grid — consisting of generators, retailers, and
distribution network system provider (DNSPs) — can also obtain
significant benefit in terms of reducing peak demand [10], low-
ering investment and operational costs [11], minimizing reserve
requirements [12], and improving power system reliability [8].
However, trading in a P2P network is challenging. This is
because, in P2P trading, it is expected that prosumers will trade
their energy with one another with a very low (or, not any)
influence from a central controller, which makes P2P platforms
a trustless system. Hence, it is a challenging task to encourage
prosumers to cooperate in such a trustless environment [3].
Further, in an energy system with a large number of users, it
is difficult to model the decision making process for various
energy trading parameters given their rational choices that can
conflict with the interests of other prosumers in the network [13].
Furthermore, electricity exchange is different from any other
exchange of goods. This is due to the fact that prosumers are
part of an electricity network, which has its own hard technical
constraints on energy exchange[14]. Completely decentralized
P2P trading could be detrimental in maintaining the technical
limit of the network within the safety range [14]. Therefore, how
to trade energy in the P2P network without compromising the
network’s security needs to be addressed. Finally, a number of
stakeholders in the grid may request of prosumers P2P services
with different objectives in mind. Thus, innovations are needed
in the pricing scheme to prioritize these requests in order to
deliver a non-congested service throughout the entire network,
while keeping the network loss at a minimum [15].
To that end, a large number of interesting results have been
reported in the literature recently with the aim to address these
2challenges. Due to the complex nature of the problem as well
as the broad range of techniques that have been used to solve
it, to have a grasp of the entire paradigm of current P2P
trading research has become a troublesome task. However, an
overall understanding of the state-of-the art P2P research is
important in order to: 1) initiate new research direction in this
field; 2) cater for new challenges that are forthcoming in the
energy sector; 3) develop more efficient and cost-effective energy
trading mechanisms to deploy in real networks; and 4) design
new services via P2P trading. Thus, having clear insight into
the current state-of-the-art in P2P energy research could be
beneficial for new researchers of power and energy systems.
This is particularly true for investigators who want to contribute
to developing a sustainable future through distributed energy
resources.
Given this context, this paper aims to provide an overview
of disruptive innovations in current P2P energy trading research
contributing to revolutionizing the future energy sector by mak-
ing the following contributions:
• We provide a background discussion of P2P networks, fea-
tures of P2P trading, P2P energy markets, and an overview
of challenges in P2P trading.
• We determine the core technical approaches that are adopted
by current studies to devise various solutions in P2P trading
and provide a detailed discussion of each of the techniques.
• We provide a number of potential research directions that
would be valuable to investigate as extensions of current
research practice.
We note that there are other recent review articles that dis-
cuss various aspects of P2P trading. For example, in [16], the
authors provide an overview of various P2P projects that are
currently being implemented in different parts of the world.
Extensive overviews of different types of P2P and community-
based market frameworks are described in [17] and [18]. How
different blockchain-based distributed ledger technologies can be
applied for various applications in energy sector are reviewed
in [19] and [20], whereas the challenges and opportunities of
these applications are discussed in [12]. Finally, optimization
techniques and other technical approaches for energy trading are
comprehensively reviewed in [21], and with a particular focus
on game-theoretic application in [13].
Indeed, these existing review studies have contributed exten-
sively to the body of energy trading knowledge that can provide
researchers with a good understanding of various technical
aspects of P2P trading. However, these reviews are suitable
mainly for those who have some understanding of energy trading,
P2P networks, and demand response management. Our paper, on
the contrary, takes a step back and targets an audience with no
or little prior knowledge of P2P trading and provides a basic
understanding of most of the aspects of P2P trading including
the definition, network elements, various layers, and market
structure of P2P networks. Then, by introducing the challenges
and solution approaches for different layers, this article helps
readers to choose research directions in a specific layer and then
have an in-depth understanding of the challenges and technical
approaches relevant to that layer. Further, this paper is also
different from existing studies in terms of organization and
focus of discussion, which is mainly the trading approaches for
addressing challenges of relevant layers. Note that this paper
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Fig. 1: An illustration of the physical layer and virtual layer platforms
of a P2P energy network.
could also be a useful resource for experienced researchers for
revising the understanding of the topic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we give an overview of the elements of P2P networks followed
by a review of P2P market structures in Section III. A detailed
overview of state-of-the-art research in P2P trading is provided
in Section IV following a systematic classification. Key technical
approaches that have been applied for P2P trading are identified
and discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VII provides some
concluding remarks with a list of potential future research
directions.
II. P2P TRADING: OVERVIEW OF NETWORK ELEMENTS
A distributed network architecture can be defined as a P2P
network, if the participants of the network share a part of their
own resources with one another. These shared resources provide
the service and content offered by the network and can be
accessed by other peers directly, without the intervention of
intermediary entities [22]. In addition, in a P2P network, any
entity can be removed or added, if necessary, without the network
suffering from any loss of network service. A formal definition
of P2P networks can be found in [9].
As shown in Fig. 1, P2P network can be divided into two
layers [13]: 1) virtual layer and 2) physical layer. The virtual
layer essentially provides a secured connection for participants
to decide on their energy trading parameters. It ensures that all
participants have equal access to a virtual platform, in which
transfer of all kinds of information takes place, buy and sell
orders are created, an appropriate market mechanism is used to
match the buy and sell orders, and finally, financial transactions
are carried out upon successful matching of the orders.
The physical layer, on the other hand, is essentially a physical
network that facilitates the transfer of electricity from sellers to
buyers once the financial settlements between both parties are
completed over the virtual layer platform. This physical network
could be the traditional distributed-grid network provided and
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Fig. 2: Different elements of P2P network.
maintained by the independent system operator or an additional,
separate physical microgrid distribution grid, in conjunction with
the traditional grid [13]. It has the necessary framework to enable
communication between different prosumers and the grid. Here,
it is important to note that the financial settlements between
different prosumers in the virtual platform does not warrant
the physical delivery of electricity; rather, the payment can be
thought of as indication from the buyers to their producing
prosumers within the P2P network to process the injecting of
renewable energy into the distribution grid.
Now, to successfully enable energy trading between different
prosumers within the P2P network, it should have a number of
key elements. A summary of these elements is given below.
A. Elements in the virtual layer
1) Information system: The heart of the P2P energy network
is a high-performing and secured information system. The in-
formation system needs to be able to: 1) enable all market
participants to communicate with one another for participating
in energy trading; 2) integrate the participants within a suitable
market platform; 3) give the participants equal access to the
market; 4) monitor the market operation; and 5) set restrictions
on participants’ decisions to ensure network security and reliabil-
ity. Examples of such information systems include blockchain-
based smart contracts [23], consortium blockchain [24], [25],
and Elecbay [10].
2) Market operation: The information system of a P2P net-
work facilitates the market operation consisting of market allo-
cation, payment rules, and a clearly defined bidding format. The
main objective of market operation is to enable the participants
to experience an efficient energy trading process by matching
the sell and buy orders in near real-time granularity. In market
operations, energy generation of each producer influences the
thresholds of a maximum and minimum allocation of energy.
Different market-time horizons may exist in the market operation
that should be able to produce enough allocation of energy at
every stage of operation.
3) Pricing mechanism: Pricing mechanisms are designed as
parts of market operations and used to efficiently balance be-
tween the energy supply and demand. Pricing mechanisms used
for P2P trading have a basic difference with that of the tradi-
tional electricity markets. For example, in traditional electricity
markets, a significant portion of electricity price consists of
electricity surcharges and taxes. However, as renewable energies
typically have very low marginal costs [11], prosumers can
reap more profits by suitably setting prices for their energies.
Nonetheless, pricing mechanisms need to reflect the state of
energy within the P2P network, that is, a higher surplus of energy
within the network should lower the energy price and vice versa.
4) Energy management system: While participating in P2P
trading via a particular bidding mechanism, the energy manage-
ment system (EMS) of a prosumer secures its supply of energy.
To that end, an EMS has access to the real-time supply and
demand information of the prosumer through the transactive me-
ter based on which it develops the generation and consumption
profile of the prosumer and subsequently decides the bidding
strategy to participate in the trading on behalf of the prosumer.
For example, The EMS of a rational prosumer may always buy
energy in the microgrid market when the price per unit of energy
falls below its maximum price threshold [13].
B. Elements in the physical layer
1) Grid connection: P2P trading can be done for both grid-
connected and islanded microgrid systems. For balancing the
energy demand and generation in a grid-connected system, it is
important to define the connection points of the main grid. By
connecting smart meters at these connection points, it is possible
to evaluate the performance of the P2P network, for example, in
terms of energy and cost savings [13]. For islanded microgrids,
on the other hand, participants should have enough generation
capacity to ensure an appropriate level of security and reliability
in supplying energy to consumers.
2) Metering: Each prosumer should have appropriate meter-
ing infrastructure to be able to participate in P2P trading. In
particular, each prosumer should be equipped with a transactive
meter [13], in addition to a traditional energy meter. A transactive
energy is capable of deciding whether to participate in the P2P
market based on the demand and generation data as well as
the information available about market conditions (price, total
demand, total available generation, and network conditions). It
can also communicate with other prosumers in the network by
any appropriate communication protocol.
3) Communication infrastructure: In P2P trading, the major
requirement of communication is the discovery of prosumers and
information exchange within the network. Multiple P2P commu-
nication architectures exist in the literature including structured,
unstructured, and hybrid architectures [26]. The choice of a
communication architecture needs to fulfill the performance
requirements recommended by the IEEE 1547.3-2007 for the
integration of DER that include latency, throughput, reliability,
and security [26].
C. Other elements
1) Market participants: For P2P energy trading, the existence
of a sufficient number of market participants within the network
is necessary and a subgroup of the participants needs to have the
capacity to produce energy. The purpose of P2P energy trading
affects the design of pricing schemes and the market mechanism
and therefore should be clearly defined. Further, the form of
energy (that is, electricity or heat) traded.
4Fig. 3: Illustration of different types of markets as proposed in the
literature for P2P trading.
2) Regulation: The success of P2P trading in the future
electricity market will probably be mostly governed by the
regulation and energy policy. That is, governmental rules of a
country decide what kind of market design will be allowed, how
taxes and fees will be distributed, and how the P2P market will
be into the existing energy market and supply systems. Thus,
governments can support P2P energy markets to accelerate the
efficient utilization of renewable energy resources and decrease
environmental degeneration by regulatory changes. On the con-
trary, they can discourage the implementation of such markets
as well if that impacts detrimentally current energy systems. An
overview of the elements of P2P network is shown in 2.
III. P2P TRADING: OVERVIEW OF MARKET STRUCTURE
In contrast to the top-down approach of the current energy
market, P2P energy trading would require reorganizing electric-
ity markets within decentralized management and collaborative
principle that will allow for a bottom-up approach to empower
prosumers [17]. Now, to determine how energy trading can be
conducted in a P2P network, as shown in Fig. 3, the market
structures that have been proposed in the literature can be divided
into three types: 1) Full decentralized markets; 2) Community-
based markets; and 3) Composite markets.
1) Fully decentralized market: In a fully decentralized P2P
market, participating prosumers can independently and directly
negotiate with one another to decide on the energy trading
parameters without any centralized supervision. Such decentral-
ization of a P2P market relies on bilateral contracts between
individual prosumers as proposed in [27]. Through the de-
signed contract, [27] captures both upstream-downstream energy
balance and forward market uncertainty within the model. In
[28], the authors propose another fully decentralized market
for multi-bilateral economic dispatch, where prosumers with
energy demand can choose their preferences for the type of
energy source, such as local or green energy, for trading. Other
examples of fully decentralized markets can be found in [11]
and [29], where in [11], the authors discuss various properties of
decentralized markets by referring to a test case of the Brooklyn
microgrid. In [29], on the other hand, the authors propose a
distributed approach based on the consensus and innovations
method to coordinate local generation, flexible load, and storage
devices within the microgrid to derive a distributed economic
dispatch algorithm.
2) Community-based market: A community-based P2P mar-
ket can readily be applied to community microgrids [30], [31]
and group of neighboring prosumers [32], in which the members
of the community share common interests and goals even though
they are not at the same location. The members may work
either in a collaborative [33] or a competitive manner [32]. In
a community-based P2P market, each member generally trades
its energy within the community through a community manager.
Indeed, a peer may also choose to trade its energy with some-
one outside the community, in which the community manager
has a function associated with the energy exchanged with the
outside world. Thus, a community manager manages the trading
activities within the community, for example, by mimicking the
role of an auctioneer [32], and also acts as an intermediary
between the community and rest of the system [17]. Under
community-based P2P energy trading, the privacy of preferences
and strategic schemes of each participant within the community
are preserved [33]. Further, the preferences of different classes
of prosumers are reflected in their choice of energy parameters
to trade within the community [34]. A demonstration of a
community-based market is shown in Fig. 3.
3) Composite market: A composite market is essentially a
combination of fully decentralized and community-based mar-
kets in which each community and each single prosumer can
interact with one another, while maintaining their own market
properties. That is, on the one hand, each individual prosumer
can engage in P2P trading between themselves, while also
interacting with existing markets like fully distributed markets.
On the other hand, a community manager can also oversee the
trading inside a community. In such a market, prosumers may be
nested into each other and form a community for trading within
the neighborhood community. Examples of such markets can be
found in [35] and [36].
Now, in a grid-connected system, a prosumer may need to deal
with both regulated and deregulated P2P markets. Hence, how to
integrate both of them in a single paradigm remains a challenge.
Nonetheless, existing literature sheds some light on the possible
ways for co-existence of such markets. For instance, in [4], the
authors propose a three-party energy trading technique in which a
community manager primarily participates in community-based
P2P trading with the prosumers of its community in order to
meet its demand for energy for maintaining different community
facilities. However, the participation of the community manager
in a regulated market for energy becomes necessary when it is
unable to procure all required energy from the prosumers within
a community. In that case, the community manager buys energy
from a regulated market.
Another interesting discussion of a potential integration sce-
nario is proposed in [6], in which prosumers primarily purchase
their energy from a regulated electricity market as traditional
customers. Now, when there is an extensive demand for energy
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Fig. 4: Demonstration of how the coordination between regulated
and deregulated P2P market with prosumers with distributed energy
resources (DERs) is captured in [6]. Prosumers energy trading switches
from regulated to deregulated P2P market with a price signal from the
grid.
from the grid, the grid sends a price signal to its selected
prosumers to refrain from buying any energy from it for a
specific period of time. Subsequently, prosumers form a fully
decentralized P2P market among themselves and meet their
demand for energy from their local generation. A graphical
presentation of this market mechanism is shown in Fig. 4.
IV. P2P TRADING: OVERVIEW OF EXISTING CHALLENGES
Indeed, by participating in different energy market structures,
on the one hand, the ultimate objective of P2P trading partic-
ipants is to address a number of challenges related to energy
trading including reducing the cost of energy usage, increasing
and maintaining the sustainable use of renewable energy, and
improving social engagement of prosumers. On the other hand,
the decision making process of the prosumers to address these
challenges are limited by the hard constraints imposed by the
power network operators for ensuring the reliable operation
of the power system without violating the voltage limit at
prosumers’ nodes, while keeping the overall network loss within
reasonable limits. As such, what follows is an overview of
how existing studies have developed P2P trading schemes as
viable energy management techniques to solve various significant
challenges of future smart grid.
A. P2P Trading Challenges in Virtual Layer
Studies proposed in the existing literature mainly focus on
designing P2P energy trading mechanisms based on suitable
pricing schemes that can enable participation of an extensive
number of prosumers. Financial transactions are required to be
securely conducted without involving a third party manager,
while, at the same time, the trading should contribute to the
achievement of desirable objectives of balancing local supply
and demand, reducing prosumers’ energy costs, and peak load
shaving. As such, based on the focus of the study, the existing
literature related to the virtual layer platform can be divided into
five general categories as outlined bellow.
1) Reducing cost of energy: First category of studies pro-
pose how P2P trading can reduce prosumers cost of energy.
Essentially, P2P trading enables small-scale prosumers with
distributed energy resources to sell their excess energy, if any,
to prosumers with energy deficiency, which has been shown
to be very effective in reducing energy cost significantly [37],
[38]. Indeed, to facilitate such a trading mechanism, interaction
among participating prosumers is the key [30], [40], [39], [41].
The performance of P2P in terms of cost savings can further
be improved if the batteries incorporated within the system also
participate in the market [42], [43], [44]. It is important to note
that P2P trading is effective in reducing prosumers’ costs for a
number of energy trading scenarios including open market urban
and remote systems [45], fully decentralized systems [9], [46],
and community-based microgrids [42].
2) Balancing local generation and demand: The reduction
in energy cost in P2P trading is due to its ability to enable
prosumers with deficiency to meet their demand by buying the
required energy from prosumers with energy surplus at a cheaper
rate [4], [3] compared to the traditional market. However, such
trading in a local environment necessitates the balance of supply
and demand of energy within the community, which is the
focus of the second category of studies. Now, for balancing the
demand and supply, a ledger is necessary that can track all the
transactions as well as the available supply from and demand
of each participating prosumers. In P2P trading, this is currently
achieved by using blockchain based platforms, as shown in [25],
[47], [48] and [49]. Under the blockchain platform, prosumers
learn the energy usage pattern of different sellers and buyers [50],
manage their own energy consumption through residential de-
mand response schemes [51], and then trade with one another,
whenever applicable, within the local community [30] to keep the
balance between supply and demand. Indeed, if there is still an
imbalance between the supply and demand, that can be fulfilled
by the grid [3], community storage [52], or diesel generator [80]
in expense of higher costs.
3) Incentivizing & engaging prosumers: Clearly, to success-
fully reap the benefits explaining in the previous two sections,
prosumers need to be actively involved in the trading mech-
anism [53]. This is only possible if prosumers find outcomes
of the P2P trading beneficial for them. Hence, the mechanisms
need to be prosumer-centric [9] (also, known as consumer-
centric [81]). The third category of existing literature devote its
efforts to determine how to incentivize prosumers to extensively
participate in P2P trading. Under this category, a large number of
techniques have been proposed to ensure prosumer-centric deliv-
ery of outcomes including multi-class energy management [34],
motivational psychology [3], bilateral contract theory [27], [54],
reinforcement learning [56], [50], game theory [3], prediction-
integrated double auction [57], consensus-based approach [28],
and aggregated battery control technique [42], [55].
4) Developing pricing mechanism: Extensive prosumers’ en-
gagement in P2P trading and the subsequent benefits exclusively
depend on the financing transactions among the participating
buyers and sellers in the trading. Therefore, there is a need for
innovative pricing schemes that are particularly applicable for
P2P trading, which is the main aspect of the fourth category
of study in the existing literature. For example, in [24], a
credit-based pricing scheme is proposed for fast and frequent
6TABLE I: Summary of different categories of studies that strive to achieve various objectives in the virtual layer and physical layer platforms.
Different lay-
ers
Challenge Overview of the study References
Virtual layer
Reducing cost of
energy
To help reduce prosumers cost of energy by enabling small-scale
prosumers with distributed energy resources to sell their excess energy
to prosumers with energy deficiency.
[37], [38], [39], [30],
[40], [41], [42], [43],
[44], [45], [9], [46],
[42]
Balancing local
generation and
demand
To enable prosumers to coordinate their energy usage and prepare the
buy and sell orders with the purpose of balancing the demand and
supply within the community.
[3], [25], [47], [48],
[49], [50], [51], [30],
[52]
Incentivizing & en-
gaging prosumers
To devise mechanism that will deliver prosumer-centric outcome to
incentivize and engage prosumers to trade energy in the P2P network.
[53], [9], [34], [3],
[27], [54], [42], [55],
[56], [50], [57], [28]
Developing pricing
mechanism
To design pricing mechanims that are suitable to apply for P2P nework
for ensure fast and frequence trading.
[24], [34], [58], [59],
[60]
Identifying
uncertainty and
asynchronicity
To identify computation and communication complexity issues for
robust system operation.
[61], [62], [63]
Securing
transactions
To enable prosumers to seamlessly engage in P2P trading through
secure financial transactions among themselves.
[64], [25], [24], [48],
[10], [23], [47], [65],
[66], [67]
Physical layer
Voltage & capacity
constraint
To prevent over voltage and reverse power flow issue due to P2P
trading.
[68], [69], [14], [70],
[23], [71]
Network power
loss
To understand the impact of P2P trading on network power loss and
subsequent cost allocation between participants.
[72], [15], [73], [34]
System strength
To understand the impact of increased use of renewable energy
resources on the system strength of the power network.
[74], [75], [76], [77],
[78], [79]
energy trading. Based on different type of prosumer classes,
a distributed price-directed optimization scheme is studied in
[34]. A discrimination pricing scheme suitable to deploy in P2P
network is discusses in [58]. Other example of different pricing
schemes can also be found in [59] and [60].
5) Identifying uncertainty and asynchronicity: While P2P
markets have substantial advantages in terms of product differ-
entiation, customer involvement, and low transaction costs, the
market outcome could be suboptimal if interaction and negotia-
tion mechanisms are not adequately designed. In particular, when
a large number of prosumers engage in P2P transactions, com-
putation and communication complexity issues must be resolved
for robust system operation. As such, extensive computational
analysis of existing decentralized and distributed algorithms is
provided in [61]. It is identified that both computation and
communication complexity impact the average time per iteration.
Computation delays appear in cases of non-performing hardware
and solving complicated optimization sub-problems. Communi-
cation delays are caused by bandwidth limits or internet traffic.
Other examples of such studies can be found in [62] and [63].
6) Securing transactions: To seamlessly engage prosumers
to perform P2P trading, the financial transactions among them-
selves need to carry out securely. Further, the buy and sell
orders and price information also need to be available over
a secured platform for the prosumers to be incentivized and
participate in the trading [64]. As such, the fifth and final
category of studies, as outlined in this paper, deal with securing
P2P transactions over the virtual layer platform. Different types
of secured transactions are modeled based on the blockchain
platform. For example, consortium blockchains are implemented
in [25] and [24] for conducting P2P trading for electric vehicles
and Industrial Internet-of-Things respectively. For energy trading
in a residential community, some popular examples of secured
transaction platform include Hyperledger [48], Elecbay [10],
smart contracts [23], [47], Ethereum [65], and multi-signature
blockchain [66].
We note that other than the discussed categories, P2P trading
is also conducted to achieve peak load shaving [82] and setup
virtual power plant [8] to provide ancillary services to the grid.
A summary of the existing studies that deal with P2P trading in
the virtual layer platform is given in Table I.
B. P2P Trading Challenges in Physical Layer
The state-of-the-research in the virtual layer platform has
laid the foundation for performing P2P trading in the energy
network by capturing decision making process of prosumers
in secured and transparent energy trading platforms as well as
devising pricing scheme to ensure their extensive participation.
However, once the decision of the energy trading parameters is
established at the virtual layer, the actual transfer of an agreed
amount of energy is transferred over the physical layer. Now,
the power system puts hard constraints on the exchange of
energy over its network [14]. As a consequence, if the decision
making process in the virtual layer platform does not consider
the potential impact of P2P trading of energy on the physical
layer platform, the transfer of energy may violate a number
of technical constraints. For example, in [68], we discuss the
feasibility of P2P trading in a grid-connected power network, in
which it is shown that some of the bus voltages may exceed the
network imposed voltage limit and compromise the security and
reliability of the network if P2P trading is coordinated ignoring
the constraints of the network.
Given this context, recently, there has been a growing interest
to address challenges that may impede the transfer of energy
over the physical layer platform of P2P networks. In particular,
three types of network challenges have been being studied in
the existing literature: 1) Violation of voltage and capacity
constraints, 2) increase in network power loss, and 3) loss of
system strength. An overview of these challenges is illustrated
in Fig. 5.
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1) Violation of voltage & capacity constraints: Since, resi-
dential users who act as prosumers are connected to low voltage
distribution systems, their active participation in P2P trading
could cause an over voltage issue [68] and reverse power
flow [69]. To combat such cases, a novel methodology based
on sensitivity analysis to assess the impact of P2P transmission
on the network and the subsequent cost with the associate energy
exchange is studied in [14]. Now, the inverters installed within
the prosumers’ premises primarily responsible for pushing power
to the network and extensive transaction of energy over the P2P
network would obviously increase the load on the inverters. This
can be reduced by exploiting grid voltage support algorithms for
smart photovoltaic inverters, based on distributed optimization
and peer-to-peer communication [70]. Another resulting detri-
mental impact of pushing power by an extensive number of
prosumers in the network could be the operational overhead,
which can increase the expense of energy transportation due to
the requirement of a long chain maintaining of many blocks [23].
A blockchain-based P2P trading scheme exploiting local energy
storage is shown to be effective to avoid such scenarios in [23].
Finally, how large prosumsers like community-microgrids that
are operated in multiple voltage levels can participate in energy
transfer is discussed in [71].
2) Increase in network power loss: While power exchange
between sellers and buyers via P2P trading could increase the
node voltages and overload the network capacity, it inevitably
incurs losses as well. Consequently, this entails extra energy
amounts and costs, above the local net demand, that needs
to be produced and recovered by each market entry [72]. To
that end, a graph-based loss allocation scheme to harmonize
the physical attributes of the low voltage distribution grid is
proposed and tested in [72]. Another cost allocation mechanism
is proposed in [15], in which costly incentives are used to
allocate P2P market related grid costs to the participants by the
system operator. In this allocation process, a degree of freedom
is given to the system operator to reach cost recovery. Other than
cost allocation, another interesting mechanism to reduce the loss
during P2P trading could be to choose an optimal power routing
strategy [73]. By doing to, as shown in [73], it is possible to
optimize power dispatching with the minimum power loss ratio
between the power seller and buyer within the P2P network.
Finally, energy classes are introduced in [34] to allow energy to
be treated as a heterogeneous product and to coordinate P2P
energy trading to minimize the cost associated with network
losses.
3) Loss of system strength: Synchronous generators make
major contributions to re-stabilize power systems following
voltage/frequency disturbances by providing system strength and
inertia [74]. However, as technologies like P2P trading penetrate
the market, the growth of renewable energy sources within
the system has been extensive. This necessitates the retirement
of a large number of synchronous generators in recent times.
As a consequence, maintaining system strength in renewable
dominated power networks is becoming more and more chal-
lenging [75]. A typical example of system failure due to lack
of system inertia can be found in the recent blackout in South
Australia [76].
As such, the necessity of investigating the impact of renewable
energy sources on the system strength has become very important
in the current context. Some example of such studies can be
found in [77], [78] and [79]. In [77], a real-time method is
designed for solar plants that coordinates photovoltaic inverters
and battery storage systems in order to provide voltage regula-
tion. The authors in [78] propose a site-dependent short-circuit
ratio to analyze the system strength and voltage variability of
renewable dominated power systems. Finally, [79] considers the
characteristics of diesel engines such as time-delay management,
spinning reserve strategies, and ramp rate to develop an optimal
photovoltaic-storage control strategy and capacity in order to
combat the variability of photovoltaic output.
Now, clearly, implementing P2P trading in power system
networks is challenging. As such, to deliver trading schemes that
address the challenges of both virtual layer and physical layer
platforms simultaneously, a number of technical approaches have
been adopted. To this end, what follows in the next section is
an overview of technical approaches that have been proven to
be effective in modeling P2P trading in the virtual and physical
layer platforms.
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Based on the approaches adopted by recent studies, four
general techniques can be identified as the main contributors
to the design of existing P2P energy trading schemes. They are
1) game theory, 2) auction theory, 3) constrained optimization,
and 4) blockchain. An overview of different technical approaches
adopted by existing studies is summarized in Table II.
A. Game theory
1) Preliminary: Game theory is a mathematical tool that
analyzes the strategic decision making process of a number of
players in a competitive situation, in which the decision of action
taken by one player depends on and affects the actions of other
players [87]. Game theory can generally be divided into two
categories: non-cooperative games and cooperative games.
Non-cooperative game: In non-cooperative games, the strate-
gic decision-making process of a number of independent players
that have partially or completely conflicting interests are ana-
lyzed to determine outcomes that are influenced by their actions.
In such games, players take their decisions without communicat-
ing with one another. Any cooperation that may arise in a non-
cooperative game cannot be a result of either communication or
coordination of strategic choices among players [88].
In general, two types of non-cooperative games have been
used for designing energy trading schemes: static games and
dynamic games. In a static game, players take their actions once
only, either simultaneously or at different times. In a dynamic
game, on the other hand, time plays a central role in the decision
making process of each player. Players in a dynamic game act
more than once and have inputs regarding the choices of other
players.
The most popular solution concept of a non-cooperative game
is the Nash equilibrium [89]. Essentially, a Nash equilibrium
refers to a stable state of a non-cooperative game in which no
player can be better paid off by unilaterally deviating from its
action, provided all other players are also taking their Nash
equilibrium strategies. For instance, let a static game Γ be
defined by Γ = {N , sn, Un}, where N is the set of all
players participating in the game, sn is the vector of strategies
of player n ∈ N , and Un is the utility function of n that
reflects the benefit that the player n can reap by choosing a
strategy sn. Now, the Nash equilibrium of Γ can be defined as
{s∗ : s∗ = [s∗n, s
∗
−n], Un(s
∗) ≥ Un(sn, s∗−n)}. Here, s
∗
−n is the
strategy vector of players in N \ {n}.
A particular non-cooperative game that has extensively been
used to design P2P trading in the literature is the Stackelberg
game [89]. A Stacklelberg game is essentially a strategic game
in which at least one player is defined as the leader who makes
its decision first and commit a strategy before other players.
Other players, on the other hand, act as the followers in the
game, who optimize their strategies in response to the action
taken by the leader. The solution concept of a Stackelberg game
is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which followers participate in
a non-cooperative Nash game among themselves and reach a
Nash equilibrium in response to the Leader’s decision. At the
Stackelberg equilibrium, neither the leader nor any follower has
any incentive to deviate from its chosen strategy [32], [6].
Cooperative game: Cooperative games, also known as coali-
tional games, deal with incentives that can make independent
decision makers to act together as one entity to improve their
position in the game. The most common form of coalitional game
is the characteristic form [88], where the value of coalition is
determined by the members of the coalition irrespective of the
structure of the coalition. Now, coalition games can be classified
into three types.
a) Canonical coalition game: In canonical coalition
games, forming a grand coalition with all players is never detri-
mental to any participant of the game. Consequently, the main
objectives of such a game is to determine whether or not a grand
coalition can be formed, to investigate if the grand coalition is
stable, and to formulate a fair revenue distribution scheme for
distributing the gains of coalition among the players. The most
commonly considered solution concept of a canonical coalition
game is the core [88]. Meanwhile, for revenue distribution, the
most popular methods include the Shapley value, the Kernel, the
nucleolus, and the strong epsilon-core.
b) Coalition formation game: The objective of static
coalition formation game is to study the network coalitional
structure. In a dynamic coalitional game, on contrary, the game
is subject to environmental changes, including a change in the
number of players or a variation in network topology. Therefore,
the main objective of this type of dynamic game is to study the
formation of a coalitional structure through players’ interactions
and inquire the properties of the structure and its adaptability to
environmental variations [13].
c) Coalitional graph game: Coalition graph games deal
with the connectivity of communications between players of
the game. The main objectives are to derive low complexity
distributed algorithms for players who want to build network
graphs and to study the properties of the graphs [88].
2) Game theory for P2P trading in the virtual layer: In the
virtual layer platform, game theory has been extensively used to
obtain different objectives that are outlined in Section V-A2. For
example, Stackelberg game has been used to reduce the cost of
energy [30], [39], [43] and to design suitable pricing scheme
for secured transaction in P2P trading [24]. The application
of non-cooperative Nash games in P2P trading can be found
for reducing energy cost [46], balancing local generation and
demand [47], [10], [49], encouraging prosumers’ participation in
the trading [27], [83], improving the security of transaction [64]
and peak shaving [82]. Finally, the authors in [40], [84], [3],
and [9] demonstrate how the framework of a canonical coalition
game can be used to obtain reduction in energy cost via balancing
local generation and demand, fairness in deciding the trading
price, and increased participation of prosumers in P2P trading
respectively.
3) Game theory for P2P trading in the physical layer: In the
physical layer platform, however, the application of game theory
has been limited so far. One application of a multiple-leader-
multiple-follower Stackelberg game can be found in [85] with
an objective to study the influence level of transmission losses
on trading behavior of retailers and consumers. In particular,
the authors propose a credit rating based optimal pricing and
energy scheduling model by considering retailers as leaders and
consumers as followers. It is shown that transmission losses
cannot be ignored in energy trading, which, if avoided, could
result in a large difference between actual power received by
consumers and their demands.
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Technical ap-
proach
General focus of the approach Popular method
Literature in
virtual layer
Literature in
physical layer
Game theory
To capture the competition and cooperation between
different participants of P2P energy trading market to
deliver a solution that is stable, sometime optimal, and
mutually beneficial for all involved parties
Stackelberg game, coalition
formation game, canonical
coalition game, non-
cooperative Nash game,
generalized Nash game.
[6], [30], [39],
[43], [24], [46],
[47], [10], [49],
[27], [83], [64],
[82], [40], [84],
[3]
[85]
Auction
theory
To capture the interaction between a number of sellers
and buyers of a P2P market so as to enable them to
trade their electricity in a step-by-step fashion.
Double auction
[6], [25], [51],
[82], [57]
[14]
Constrained
optimization
To use mathematical programming technique for opti-
mizing the parameters of P2P trading under different
hard and soft constraints imposed by the market and
power system.
LP, MILP, ADMM, NLP
[55], [44], [34],
[42], [37], [54]
[15], [70], [73]
Blockchain
To provide a data structure that can be replicated and
shared among members to enable secured, transparent,
and decentralized energy trading in a P2P network.
Smart contract, Elecbay,
consortium blockchain,
Hyperledger, Ethereum
[86], [40], [25],
[24], [66], [47],
[49], [48], [10],
[59], [64], [65]
Not available
B. Double Auction
1) Preliminary: A double auction involves a market of a
number of buyers and sellers seeking to interact so as to trade
their goods [90]. In a double auction, potential buyers submit
their bids to an auctioneer while, at the same time, potential
sellers simultaneously ask prices to the auctioneer. This is usually
done through a step-by-step process as follows [91]:
(1) Sellers submit their reservation prices in an increasing order.
(2) Buyers are arranged in a decreasing order of their reservation
bids.
(3) Once the sellers and buyers orders are ordered, the aggre-
gated supply and demand curves are generated that meet at
a intersection point.
(4) The intersection point establishes the auction price and the
number of seller and buyers that eventually engage in the
market trading process.
In the double auction process, the sellers and buyers need to
truthfully report their reservation prices and bids for efficient
operation of the market. Hence, auction mechanisms need to
satisfy the properties of individual rationality and incentive
compatibility [32]. Now, a double auction scheme is said to
possess the property of individual rationality if the utility that
a prosumer receives for participating in the auction mechanism
cannot be improved otherwise, provided all other prosumers in
the auction are choosing their selected strategies. Meanwhile,
a double auction mechanism is called incentive-compatible, if
every participant of the auction mechanism can achieve the best
outcome to themselves by acting upon their true preference that
they revealed during the above mentioned Steps 1 and 2.
2) Double auction for P2P trading in the virtual layer: In
the virtual layer platform, double auction technique has been
used by [25], [51], [82], [57] to achieve objectives of balancing
local generation and demand, shaping the demand at the peak
hour, and improving prosumers engagement in the trading. For
example, the authors in [25] propose a consortium blockchain
enabled double auction mechanism to decide on the electricity
price and traded energy amount by the prosumers in order to
maintain the balance between the local generation and supply.
For a similar purpose, an optimal bidding strategy via a double
auction is proposed in [51] for residential houses. In [82] and
[57], the authors exploit a Nash bargaining model and data-driven
prediction-integration models respectively to design the double
auction frameworks with the purpose of reducing peak demand
and improving prosumers’ engagement in P2P trading.
3) Double auction for P2P trading in the physical layer:
The application of double auction to address problems related to
physical layer platform is elaborated in [14]. In particular, [14]
propose a decentralized P2P architecture that can facilitate local
energy trading. In designing the scheme, the authors explicitly
take into account the underlying network constraints at the
distribution level. The market mechanism is developed using a
continuous double auction technique, a simple market format
that matches parties interested in trading, rather than holding
any of the traded commodity itself. As such, this scheme is very
well suited for P2P exchanges. It is further shown in [14] that
in continuous double auctions comprising bidders with rational
goals (i.e. participants only trade at a profit), trades are always
Pareto-improving. Subsequently, the continuous double auction
moves towards an allocation that is Pareto efficient with a highly
efficient allocation of commodities [92].
C. Constrained optimization
1) Preliminaries: A number of constrained optimization tech-
niques have been used to design P2P energy trading schemes.
Examples of some techniques include linear programming (LP),
mixed integer linear programming (MILP), alternating direction
method of multipliers (ADMM), and nonlinear programming
(NLP).
a) LP: LP is a mathematical programming technique to
achieve the optimal outcome in a mathematical model, in which
all requirements are presented by linear forms. Any LP can be
expressed in its canonical form as
Maximize bTx, (1)
such that Ax ≤ c, and x ≥ 0. Here, x is the vector of variables
to be determined, c and b are coefficient vectors, A is a matrix
of coefficients, and (·)T is the transpose of (·). The expression in
(1) is called the objective function and the inequalities Ax ≤ c
and x ≥ 0 are known as the constraints that need to be satisfied.
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b) MILP: MILP is a special case of integer linear program-
ming, in which only some of the variables are constrained to be
integers and, unlike integer linear programming, other variables
are allowed to be non-integer. Mathematically, an MILP can be
expressed as same as an integer linear programming
Maximize bTx, (2)
subject to Ax+ s = c, x ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, and x ∈ Zn, where some
of the entries are not integer.
c) ADMM: ADMM is an algorithm that solves convex
optimization problems by breaking them into smaller pieces,
each of which are then easier to handle [93]. Essentially, ADMM
is a variant of augmented Lagrangian scheme that uses partial
updates for the dual variables. This can be mathematically
expressed for a maximization problem as
Maximizex,zf(x) + g(z), (3)
subject to Ax + Bz = c, where is z is a vector of second
variables. Thus, ADMM can have two objectives with two
separate sets of variables.
d) NLP: NLP is a mathematical technique that solves an
optimization problem, in which the objective function is non-
linear and/or the feasible region is determined by nonlinear
constraints. In maximization form, the problem can be expresses
as that in (1) with nonlinear objective function and/or nonlinear
constraints.
2) Constrained optimization for P2P trading in the virtual
layer: Different constrained optimization techniques have been
heavily utilized in the literature to design P2P energy trading
techniques in the virtual layer platform. For example, in [55],
the authors exploit a LP approach to design a novel multi-
energy management strategy based on the complementarity of
multi-energy demand with the purpose to explore optimal energy
scheduling problems of prosumers. An MILP technique is used
by [44] to optimize the use of energy generated from the
rooftop solar with battery for P2P energy trading. A multi-class
energy management technique with the purpose of P2P trading
is designed in [34] using ADMM optimization technique. The
application of NLP in [42] is for designing a P2P energy sharing
mechanism in a community through aggregated battery control.
Further use of constrained optimization in P2P trading can be
found in [37] and [54].
3) Constrained optimization for P2P trading in the physical
layer: In the physical layer, the most popular constrained
optimization technique has been ADMM as can be seen from
its application in [15] and [70]. In [15], authors discusses a
decentralized consensus ADMM to develop a cost allocation
mechanism that enable prosumers to share the cost of using
common infrastructure and services for P2P trading. Meanwhile,
ADMM is utilized in [70] to locally optimize reactive power
compensation and active power curtailment of each inverter
participating in the P2P trading for voltage control purposes.
Besides, ADMM, the application of constrained optimization has
also been exploited in [73] for addressing network loss issues at
the physical layer.
D. Blockchain
1) Preliminaries: Blockchain, which was first introduced in
[94], is a distributed data structure that is replicated and shared
among the members of a network. With blockchain in place,
applications that could previously run only through a trusted
intermediary, can now operate in a decentralized fashion, without
the need for a central authority, and achieve the same function-
ality with the same amount of certainty [95]. Thus, given the
properties of P2P trading, blockchain has profound applications
in the future energy network. This has led to establish a number
of blockchain based platforms for P2P energy trading in recent
times.
a) Smart contracts: The smart contract is essentially a
computerized transaction protocol that executed the terms of
a contract [96]. By translating contractual clauses into code
and embedding them into property that can enforce them, the
need for trusted intermediaries between transacting parties, and
the occurance of malicious and accidental exceptions can be
minimized [95]. Within the blockchain context, smart contracts
are scripts stored on the blockchain with a unique address [86].
A smart contract is triggered by addressing a transaction to it.
It then executes independently and automatically in a prescribed
manner on every node in the network, according to the data that
was included in the triggering transaction.
b) Elecbay: The elecbay is a software platform dedicated
to the development of P2P trading within a microgrid. Each order
contains the information including the time period for the energy
exchange, the amount of energy to be exchanged, the price of the
energy to be exchanged and the details about the seller and buyer.
After the orders are placed by peers, they are either accepted or
rejected by Elecbay, based on the network constraints. After the
order acceptance or rejection, each peer generates/consumes the
amount of energy as promised in the accepted orders and energy
is delivered through the distribution network. Further details of
the platform can be found in [10].
c) Consortium blockchain: The consortium blockchain is a
specific blockchain with multiple authorized nodes to establish
the distributed shared ledger with moderate cost [25]. It is
established on authorized nodes to publicly audit and share
transaction records without relying on a trusted third party.
During P2P trading, energy transaction records among peers
are uploaded to the authorized nodes after encryption. The
authorized nodes run an algorithm to audit the transactions
and record them into the shared ledger. This ledger is publicly
accessed by participating peers and authorized nodes connected
to the consortium blockchain.
d) Hyperledger: The hyperledger is an open source col-
laborative effort, hosted by the Linux Foundation, to advance
cross-industry blockchain technologies [97]. It uses a consensus
mechanism to create a transparent and non-tampering distributed
ledger. According to [98], the core module of the Hyperledger
IBM runs in an open platform called Docker. When a peer
within the system wants to trade, it logs into the system through
the blockchain system terminal and submits the appropriate
transaction. After the transaction is submitted, the transaction
information is sent to a power trading unit to analyse and initiate
the transaction. The information is mapped in the database in the
form of key and value for user query. When mapping is complete,
the power trading unit carries out the dispatching to complete
the power trading.
e) Ethereum: The Ethereum, which was launched in 2015,
is a programmable public blockchain with a native cryptocur-
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rency called Ether [99]. While the structure of Ethereum is very
similar to that of bitcoin, a big difference is that in ethereum
nodes also store the most recent state of each smart contract,
in addition to all other ether transactions. For each ethereum
application, the network needs to keep track of the the current
information of all of these applications, including each peer’s
balance, all the smart contract code, and the location where it’s
all stored. Like bank account funds, ether tokens appear in a
wallet, and can be ported to another account.
Besides the outlined classification, other modified versions of
blockchain based approaches have also been used for securing
energy trading in smart grid. Examples of such modified schemes
can be found in [40] and [66].
2) Blockchain for P2P trading in the virtual layer: In the
virtual layer, existing studies have exploited a large variation
of blockchain based platforms to ensure secure and transparent
energy trading. In [40], the authors propose a blockchain based
system, which is based on a parallel double-chain combined
with a high frequency verification mechanism to enable a trusted
and secure settlement of electricity trading transactions. To
achieve a similar energy trading performance among plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles within an electricity market, [25] and
[24] develop trading platforms using consortium blockchain. A
multi-signature based blockchain is designed in [66] to provide
transaction security in decentralized energy trading in smart grid
without reliance on trusted third parties. Using smart contracts,
secured P2P trading between energy storage systems and hetero-
geneous end-users from residential, commercial, and industry
sectors are performed in [47] and [49] respectively. In [48],
the authors utilize the IBM hyperledger fabric architecture to
create an operational model of crowdsourced energy systems in
distribution networks considering various types of energy trading
transactions and crowdsources. For secured energy trading in
microgrids, Elecbay is proposed in [10]. Further application of
blockchain based platforms for decentralized energy supply and
demand management via P2P trading can be found in [59], [64],
[65] and [100].
3) Blockchain for P2P trading in the physical layer: Since
the physical layer is mainly responsible for accommodating
the transfer of energy from sellers to buyers after the secured
transactions, the focus of how the security of such transactions
may impact physical layer performance is not necessary and
therefore has not been reported to date. Now, while game
theory, double auction, constrained optimization, and blockchain
have been extensively used in the literature for designing P2P
energy trading scheme, a number of new other methods are
also becoming popular. Examples of such emerging techniques
include graph theory [72], heuristic multi-agent simulation [101],
artificial intelligence [56], [50], and activity based models [38].
VI. DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION
Note that despite extensive attention in the last couple of
years, energy-management research for peer-to-peer networks is
relatively new. Hence, much work is yet to be done before the
integration of peer-to-peer energy trading into the current energy
system. To that end, what follows is a description of a number
of challenges that require further investigation as future research
topics in the area of P2P trading. An overview of these challenges
is also illustrated in Fig. 6.
a) Network charge identification: Unlike traditional elec-
tricity systems, prosumers do not use the entire energy network
for peer-to-peer trading. Therefore, the way they are currently
being charged in their electricity bills needs to be researched and
revised for billing them under a peer-to-peer trading paradigm.
b) Large scale network trading and simulation: Since the
flow of electricity cannot be regulated, it is unlikely for a very
large network that the intended receiver will receive the actual
power that has been pushed to the network by the sender. Hence,
the power loss due to peer-to-peer trading would be different,
which necessitates further investigation. Further, P2P trading
algorithms need to be simulated for large-scale realistic power
system model to observe the impact of computational complexity
on the conduct of trading in such a large system.
c) Benefit to the grid: Consumer-centricity of peer-to-peer
trading has been well established in recent literature. However,
the benefit of peer-to-peer energy trading to the distribution grid
also needs to be demonstrated. Further, the grid should also have
the provision to participate in P2P trading either as a generator or
service provider, if necessary. This will be particularly important
to pave the way for this new approach to be approved as a part
of the energy system.
d) Ancillary service to the grid: Peer-to-peer trading has
demonstrated potential to form coalitions between the prosum-
sers of the network to achieve a reliable and cost-effective
supply of energy. Now, it would be an interesting extension
to investigate how such coalitions can help to provide ancillary
services to the grid such as with virtual power plants.
e) Multi-level storage management: With P2P trading, it
is expected that a community may have different types of
storage facilities, including small-scale batteries at the prosumers
premises, medium-scale community storage, and large-scale grid
storage. Coordination between these storage devices in an eco-
nomic way and developing suitable pricing mechanisms to con-
duct inter-storage energy sharing would be a very complicated
problem. Therefore, innovative scheduling and optimization tech-
niques need to be developed.
f) Prioritizing stakeholders: Clearly, different stakeholders
would be interested in exploiting prosumers’ batteries to deliver
different services to their customers and maintain network secu-
rity. For example, generators may want to use them for reducing
production volatility, Distribution Network Service Providers
(DNSP) for demand constraint, and retailers may want to dis-
charge the batteries to combat energy imbalances. Nevertheless,
these actions could be conflicting with one another. Hence, P2P
trading schemes need to be designed such that they do not affect
participants’ independence and benefits.
g) Injection limit and market mechanism: At present, a
cap is being set for each prosumer on the maximum amount
of energy its inverter can send to the grid. This limits prosumers
capacity to install larger capacity rooftop solar PV and earn more
revenue. With P2P trading, prosumers can actively negotiate with
one another on the amount of energy they can trade with one
another and the pricing. Therefore, the injection limit needs to be
flexible to extract the most benefits from such decision making
processes. This necessitates the development of novel market
mechanisms that will dynamically change the injection limit
based on the supply and demand of energy within the network
without impacting the network detrimentally.
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Fig. 6: Overview of different challenges of P2P trading for future research.
h) Unified model: At present, research are directed either
to the virtual layer or to the physical layer. However, for a
successful deployment of P2P trading within the network, it is
important that requirements of both layers be addressed. Hence,
there is a need for a unified model, which could capture this.
This is particularly possible as blockchain based information
systems make all real-time system information available to both
prosumers and system operator. Thus, it could be possible for
the system operator to assist the participants to take decisions in
the virtual layer that do not contradict with the constraints in the
physical layer. Nevertheless, the extent to which a system op-
erator can influence prosumers’ behaviors needs to be carefully
articulated. Otherwise, the decentricity of P2P trading could be
compromised.
i) Enabling data accessibility with privacy: Of signifi-
cant importance to the performance of the P2P trading, both
intra-community and inter-community, is statistically useful,
and accurate, energy transaction and usage data being made
available across communities, for better prosumers decision
making. However, this accessible data needs to also provide
privacy to each prosumer. Thus provably-private transformations,
of communities? energy trading data, are required to facilitate
data accessibility and required sharing, while providing sufficient
statistical accuracy for interrogation of the data. This remains a
key research challenge, as such deployment is highly dependent
on the applied scenarios for the P2P trading, and also on the
desired level of utility from the privacy-preserved data.
j) Inter & Intra-community trading: In P2P trading, a pro-
sumer should have enough flexibility to decide whether it wants
to trade with peers within its community (intra-community) or
with someone external (inter-community). Market mechanisms
for P2P trading should have policies and technologies ready to
accommodate such flexibility.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this review article, an overview of existing research in
peer-to-peer energy trading has been provided. As such, first,
the background of peer-to-peer trading in energy networks has
been discussed with specific emphasize on features of peer-to-
peer networks, market structure for peer-to-peer trading, and
opportunities and challenges. Second, a systematic classification
of peer-to-peer energy has been proposed based on the relevant
challenges in both virtual and physical layers that have been
addressed by the state-of-the-art research papers. Third, core
technical approaches that have been extensively used in the
literature have been identified and summarized. In addition, an
overview of the application of these identified approaches for
peer-to-peer trading in virtual and physical layers has been pro-
vided. Finally, this paper have discussed a number of interesting
topics for researchers to work on in the future.
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